Gestation by substution

questions about its legitimacy

Abstract

We address in this article the issue of gestation by substitution as a bioethical problem, that is, as a new situation in which maternity and pregnancy are separated thanks to biotechnological advances that have allowed assisted reproduction techniques; we inquire into the possibility of its ethical correction and the corresponding legalization outlining the conditions. We divide this work into three parts. In a first, introductory, we narrow the focus of the problem and we need some vocabulary questions. In the second part, the most extensive by nuclear, we proceed to the discussion of the reasons from which the surrogate motherhood  could be legitimated. In order to be legitimated  we distinguish three types of arguments: from principle, a priori or deontological arguments; procedural or prudential arguments, and consequentialist or impact arguments. From these three types of reasons, in the third part we conclude how a certain form of surrogate motherhood  could be legitimated.