

# Philosophy and Cultural Heritage. An Approach to Philosophy in Museal Contexts

*Filosofía y patrimonio cultural. Una aproximación a la filosofía en contextos museísticos*

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**Abstract:** The following considerations form a philosophical approach to the meaning of cultural heritage. They are an attempt to answer the question, which position and task philosophy holds or may hold for this heritage. In a first section it is shown that there is no escape from the cultural heritage. For this purpose, it is resorted to the juxtaposition of «to have or to be» by the social psychologist Erich Fromm. Following this distinction, two basic approaches are sketched that precisely fail to do justice to the cultural heritage and to the way of dealing with it that is necessary for one's own location in the world. These sketches serve as a background against which the significance of philosophy in and for the cultural heritage is discussed, in order to be able to grasp the appropriate approach to philosophy in museal contexts. As a result, museums are proving to be part of the philosophical heritage, at least in terms of possibility.

**Keywords:** cultural heritage, ontology, thinking, anthropological philosophy.

**Resumen:** Las siguientes consideraciones forman un enfoque filosófico del significado del patrimonio cultural. Son un intento de responder a la pregunta de qué posición y qué tarea tiene o puede tener la filosofía en cuanto a este patrimonio. En un primer apartado se muestra que no hay escapatoria al patrimonio cultural. Para ello, se recurre a la yuxtaposición de «tener o ser» del psicólogo social Erich Fromm. Siguiendo esta distinción, se esbozan dos enfoques básicos que precisamente fallan en hacer justicia al patrimonio cultural y a la forma de tratarlo necesaria para la propia ubicación en el mundo. Estos bocetos sirven de trasfondo sobre el que se discute el significado de la filosofía en y para el patrimonio cultural, con el fin de poder captar el enfoque apropiado de la filosofía en contextos museísticos. Como resultado, los museos están demostrando ser parte del patrimonio filosófico, al menos en términos de posibilidad.

**Palabras clave:** patrimonio cultural, ontología, pensamiento, filosofía antropológica.

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### *The Impossibility of Rejecting Cultural Inheritance*

Heirs are people to whom a testator has passed his or her possessions. The heir can accept this inheritance or, at least in Germany, reject it within a specified period of six weeks (§ 1944 of the German Civil Code). With this possibility to reject one's inheritance, the analogy between the legal sphere of heritage and the «cultural heritage» already comes to its end. It is possible for someone to reject their family heritage —as Ludwig Wittgenstein did, for example<sup>1</sup>— without at the same time getting rid of one's family history. It is not possible to reject the cultural heritage, or more precisely: also the neglect of the cultural heritage is based on this very heritage. Culturally, the line of succession cannot be avoided<sup>2</sup>.

It becomes clear that the semantic fields of inheritance law and cultural heritage are different. This difference can be captured along the juxtaposition of «to have or to be» which was introduced by social psychologist Erich Fromm (1976). «Having» can be ascribed to the domain of law and «being» to the domain of culture. If «having» goes hand in hand with possession, «being» in Fromm's sense means «being active». Although possession, i. e.

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1 Here, the different handling of heritage among philosophers shall only be hinted at with reference to Schopenhauer, who was very anxious to secure his share of the family fortune for the purpose of his independence. However, both Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein could not reject the thinking that preceded them. Schopenhauer was strongly based on Kant, while Wittgenstein explicitly dealt with Augustine's philosophy of language in his «Philosophical Investigations».

2 Incidentally, this also means that the obligations associated with cultural heritage cannot be rejected.

having something, does not exclude «being», there is a danger that the possessed will not be handled productively if the wanting-to-have is hypostatized as the determining mode of being. In contrast to mere possession, this productive handling is understood as an interrelational engagement in the present context. Cultural inheritance then describes a continuous process of appropriation<sup>3</sup>. As a possessor one holds the power of disposal, as a being person one holds an obligation of appropriation. Cultural heritage cannot be possessed, at the most we are possessed by it.

For Fromm, «being» is not passive, but always means being active, a productive and active engagement with oneself, with others, with the world and with what has been and is being created in it, that is what is culturally inherited. Fromm distinguishes this way of being active from «busyness». Busyness is an in Fromm's sense unproductive process because it is precisely not about appropriation. This is since —as Fromm notes with reference to Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart— busyness lacks the proximity to the spiritual-emotional human «essence». It is therefore central to leave aside busyness from shaping the cultural heritage process, even if it may now and then underlie one or the other cultural inheritance dispute and estate administration<sup>4</sup>.

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3 Currently cultural appropriation is often rightfully discussed critically from decolonial and anti-racist perspectives. In the present context, the process of appropriation is understood as firmly distinguished from neocolonial and racist practices of cultural appropriation. In contrast, the Active appropriation means precisely not to simply adopt and incorporate cultural practices. Instead, it involves the intellectual (re) thinking, dealing, embracing and adaption of cultural heritage. For the detailed development of this argument see below.

4 At the same time, this does not mean that business efficiency should be excluded from cultural heritage management at all costs; after all, in some cases it can condition the possibility to realize productive processes of appropriation on the cultural object. For a fundamental critique of busyness as an approach to cultural heritage, see below.

The productive appropriation of what has been culturally handed on has been outlined here with reference to Erich Fromm's distinction between two modes of being. This distinction is elevated to a human characteristic by the cultural philosopher Georg Simmel (1900: 627). Simmel differentiates cultural inheritance from (mere) descendancy:

If it has been called an advantage of humans over animals that they would be heirs and not merely descendants, then the reification of the human mind through words and works, organizations and traditions is what carries this distinction. It is this distinction that gives humankind its world, indeed: a world.  
[translation of the author]

The cultural heritage, i. e. the entirety of material and immaterial cultural goods, are what make our world our world in the first place.

Thus, next to «Mangelverwaltung» (Johann Gottfried Herder), «Geist» (Max Scheler), «eccentricity» (Helmuth Plessner) as well as next to «Symbolzentrierung» (Ernst Cassirer), «being-heir» can be counted to the solid core of philosophical anthropology.

But more precisely, what is to be understood by this «being active», by this continuously productive appropriation of the culturally inherited? The reference to Erich Fromm's dichotomy «to have or to be» already indicates in a first approach that mere passive acceptance does just as little justice and is just as inappropriate to the cultural inheritance process as an activist busyness.

### *Activity: Memory as a Selection*

The English term «cultural heritage» was codified in the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in

the Event of Armed Conflict. The term finds its way into German-speaking contexts in connection with this international protection agreement following the English *cultural heritage* as well as the French *patrimoine culturel*<sup>5</sup>.

This short excursion into the history of the term should indicate that «cultural heritage» was essentially shaped by the fear of loss. This is interesting from a cultural-historical perspective because the development of the art of memory as a subfield of ancient rhetoric in Greece is also founded in a story of loss: precisely in the origin narrative of the poet, statesman and world-wise Simonides of Keos, who is regarded as the inventor of the art of memory. In his rhetoric textbook *De oratore*, Cicero recounts a banquet at which Simonides was to recite a lyric poem in honor of the host. When the roof of the banquet hall collapsed, Simonides had just left the hall, so that he, unlike the celebrants in the hall, survived the accident. Later, Simonides recalled who had taken which place at the table when he left the hall, thus contributing to the relatives' identification and appropriate burial of their loved ones with his memory performance.

Memory conditions the possibility for the appropriate dealing with the lost and the dead ones. Hence, the protection of cultural heritage is no other than a mnemotechnique that is established in international law, and that seeks to repeat the Simonidian memory performance with mnemotechnic means. It is not the cultural goods assigned to and protected by the cultural heritage, be they immaterial, movable, or immovable, that are to be remembered. They are deliberately selected markers that

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5 On the history of the term, cf. Bierwerth 2018. Gesa Bierwerth points to the belated spreading of the term *kulturelles Erbe* (cultural heritage) in Germany. Here the term only found entry in the 1980s —rather late in international comparison. Bierwerth attributes this delay to the problematic legacy of Germany's past.

open up and enable memories, and they are collection points of cultural origin and identity. Sabine von Schorlemer (2016: 312) formulates this relation to the present as follows:

Cultural heritage not only bundles the collective memories of humanity and the expressions of our ancestors. It also positively represents the dignity, uniqueness, and identity of humans, peoples, groups, and communities living today. [translation of the author]

And it is from here that the path to the future is paved, because, as the classical philologist Manfred Fuhrmann (2002: 111) emphasizes, those who lack a past also lack a future.

The destruction of cultural heritage, such as in Palmyra and Aleppo, must therefore be interpreted as an attack on tradition, origin, identity, and the future of others, carried out by a religiously uprooted, and territorially and culturally detached fundamentalism<sup>6</sup>. With this detachment from cultural integration,

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<sup>6</sup> Because of this close link between cultural heritage and questions of individual and collective identity, it is important to focus on the ethical connotations associated with the preservation and transmission of cultural heritage. Sutter (1998), for instance, discusses the question to what extent cultural identity can be considered as part of human rights. This ethical dimension is largely left out in the present context. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the appropriation process of cultural heritage guiding the considerations at hand is not arbitrary and not a wishful thinking. In Germany, this has currently become apparent in the discussion about the non-European collections which are on display in the Humboldt-Forum in the Berlin Palace since 2020. It has become apparent that these collections cannot be separated from Germany's oppressive and bloody colonial history. As Alaida Assmann (2020: 282) remarks, «In this building, the contours of a voluntary and an involuntary cultural heritage collide heavily. Without anyone having planned it this way, there is a sudden stage and a concrete framework in Berlin in which this denied European heritage in its German variant becomes the object of historical enlightenment and social discussion» [translation of the author].

fundamentalisms also lose their embedding in a polyphonic discourse. Consequently, all intermediate tones and nuances disappear in the religious and cultural appropriation process of what has been handed down<sup>7</sup>. There is only an either-or, belonging or not belonging, and a present without origin<sup>8</sup>. This must be contrasted by noting that one cannot speak on behalf of a culture, but only within that culture, as one voice among many<sup>9</sup>. Accordingly, the fundamentalist attack on cultural heritage is simultaneously evidence of its importance. The life and living together of people in its fullness and peacefulness is possible only in the diversity and richness of cultural heritage.

That this process of appropriation cannot simply mean a takeover of what is culturally inherited is shown by the role that forgetting plays for remembrance. Forgetting makes it possible to protect oneself from a kind of «Messie-Historie» (Ebers 2012: 123)<sup>10</sup>. Such a hoarded history «clutters» the memory arbitrarily<sup>11</sup>. This conceptualization of forgetting applies to both individual and cultural memory. Only by being referred to, the

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7 This interpretation follows Roy (2010) who notes that this is a characteristic trait of modern fundamentalism, not of (one) religion. Fundamentalism is found in Islam, Christianity, and other religions.

8 The destruction of cultural heritage serves the «transfer of all previous history into an uncontested now». (Bredekamp 2016: 13, translation of the author) Bredekamp, an art historian, develops this concept of oblivion of history and origin by using the example of Islamist destructiveness against cultural goods cast in stone. Bredekamp pleads for the reconstruction of destroyed architectural monuments. They then lack the aura of the original but nevertheless develop a new originality. In the sense of cultural heritage as a continuous accomplishment of appropriation, Bredekamp's plea is to be agreed with completely.

9 The philosopher Hans Jörg Sandkühler (2012) sees the primary task of human rights in preserving this polyphony.

10 «Messie syndrome» as a German term is derived from *to mess* and means an obsessive behaviour in which the excessive accumulation of more or less worthless items in one's home is compulsive hoarding.

11 The meaning of forgetting is philosophically extensively recalled in Ricoeur 2000.



past comes into being (Assmann 2000: 31ff.). Such a reference means an active selection. Something is preserved from oblivion and thus highlighted as worthy of remembrance. Mere passive acceptance is ultimately an indifference, which prevents remembering. Individually as well as culturally, remembering always implies an active appropriation of what is to be remembered.

*Busyness: Remembrance as Business*

In a first step, the passivity excluded from Erich Fromm's «being» was shown as unsuitable for dealing with cultural heritage. Now, in a second step, the manner of actively engaging with cultural heritage will be outlined in more detail.

Fromm distinguishes «busyness» and «productive activity» as two forms of activity. In difference to being active, doing remains purely external in busyness. my busyness and that with which i have a business remains alien to me. It appears to me without at the same time becoming part of me, my doing, and my development. Here, Fromm characterizes busyness with all due caution as an alienated activity. He contrasts it with non-alienated productive activity, in which productivity does not result in a created «product». Instead, it results in an act related in activity to activity and thus to the active person themselves. Unlike in the dead world of objects of having, the active person enters a dialogue with that with which they are engaged: «The productive person brings to life everything they touch» (Fromm 1976: 93, translation of the author).

To «touch» here also means to perceive something, to direct one's attention to something, to occupy oneself with something, i. e., for example, with cultural heritage. The appropriation of cultural heritage is then not a matter of «dead stones» that are

visited and whose highlighted cultural meaning is memorized to be able to recall what has been learned during more or less suitable occasions<sup>12</sup>. This would be a process of learning, knowledge, and remembering that remains merely external and would be attributed to Fromm's mode of «having». Cultural heritage and the conception of what is inherited thus become part of the «culture industry» (Horkheimer, Adorno 1985: 108-150) and its commodity logic. In this industry, those economic intentions prevail which essentially obey an economy of attention and thus a logic of constant increase and improvement in media societies and digitalized media worlds. Cultural heritage is offered for sale and then consumed (Nott 2019, 17). And in the worst case, it is used up and depleted.

Memory markers would be missing, and the described Simoniadian memory process would fail due to the non-existing mnemonic essential goods of the cultural heritage. Entangled problematic consequences for the present and future individual and societal positioning in the world have already been indicated. Therefore, the sustainable protection of cultural heritage is existential and essential. Goods of cultural heritage must be passed on as «transcendental goods»<sup>13</sup>. Along with other «transcendental goods», cultural goods are not everything, but without them everything is nothing. They are enabling goods, conditions of the possibility towards self-understanding and understanding of others, and towards dialogue. The engagement with the cultural heritage in the mode of being describes a sustainable, active,

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12 This can be the case, for example, in the context of examinations or scholarly conversations. That the latter do not always have to be erudite conversations at the same time is explained in Ebers, Melchers 2006: 115.

13 On the meaning of «transcendental goods» see Kersting, Wolfgang: *Theorien der sozialen Gerechtigkeit* [Theories of social justice], Stuttgart, Weimar 2000, pp. 26-29. These theories are closely aligned with the theory of «public goods».

associative process of appropriation that cannot be separated from one's own person. It is to be understood more precisely as a process of understanding in which one's own origins and those of Others, and thus one's own position in and positioning on the world, become more transparent.

*Being Active: Philosophy and the Cultural Heritage*

This admittedly schematic sketch of a productive engagement with cultural heritage is sufficient as a background to be able in a next step to explore the roles and possible tasks of philosophy in the context of the continuous appropriation of cultural heritage in the museal context. Here it should become clear that philosophy is an excellent way for the appropriation process described at the beginning, even though it is only one of many possible approaches to cultural heritage.

Philosophy and cultural heritage are related in two ways:

On the one hand, we encounter philosophy in the cultural heritage. It is itself part of the cultural heritage. As such, it is itself the object of preservation and presentation in museums in the form of artifacts relevant to the history of philosophy. For example, autographs from Immanuel Kant's bequest can be exhibited. Even the whip from the famous painting with Lou Andre Salome, Paul Ree and Nietzsche could be on display<sup>14</sup>. This range of possible objects for exhibition in the context of material philosophical heritage as part of cultural heritage supports

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14 The 1882 photograph by Jules Bonnet shows Lou Andreas-Salomé on a kind of carriage with a whip and Paul Rée and Friedrich Nietzsche as horses. Admittedly, it is not known to the author whether this whip is available for museum display. As an artifact, however, it would certainly be of interest because it opens an unusual perspective on the famous aphorism from Nietzsche's Zarathustra: «You go to women? Do not forget the whip!».

Jordi Arcos Pumarola's (2016: 45) observation that philosophy as a resource of cultural heritage in the museal context is rich enough to attract interest beyond a purely professional audience. So, individual actors, time periods, or thematic fields from the history of philosophy can be presented in museums. The cultural goods represented in this way illustrate the or a philosophical heritage. Belonging to the philosophical heritage, however, does not protect them from the general danger that accompanies the perception of cultural heritage: that such perception takes place only in the mode of having and consuming.

On the other hand, philosophy, or rather philosophizing, encounters cultural heritage. In this approach, a different understanding of philosophy is followed than in the context of philosophy as a resource for cultural goods. Thus, now it is not about the history of philosophy, about the life and work of persons who have particularly distinguished themselves in this field, or about works that belong or should belong to the classical inventory. There are many comprehensive and excellent accounts of the history of philosophy. These can be read, the contents can be memorized and understood. Philosophy in this sense, according to Kant, can be learned. However, there is no «final world wisdom» to be learned<sup>15</sup>. Everybody must approach this world wisdom «researching» themselves. This is what Kant means when he writes that not philosophy, but philosophizing is to be learned. His later distinction between a «school concept» and a «world concept» of philosophy points in a very similar direction<sup>16</sup>. In the latter, philosophy remains related to the world

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15 According to Kant in his «Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in dem Winterhalbjahr von 1765-1766» [Announcement of the Program of his Lectures for the Winter Semester, 1765-1766] (AA II, 303-308)

16 *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* [*Critique of Pure Reason*], AA III, pp. 542-543. and *Logik* [*Logic*], AA IX, pp. 23-25.

and our position in it. It is not (narcissistically) concerned with its own history and systematics as a science, but with that which we encounter in the world and with the problem of having to find one's way in the world in which one finds oneself. Kant's «world concept» of philosophy is, notwithstanding all questions about a completed systematics of human knowledge, quasi an existentialist basic mode of a non-concludable process of appropriation about ourselves. One does not «have» this philosophy. This philosophy cannot be squeezed between the covers of a book, conveyed didactically in YouTube videos or museal contexts. This philosophy is the «productive activity» par excellence described by Erich Fromm.

### *Philosophy in Museums and Museal Contexts*

Philosophy in the museum means to understand museums not as places of storage, but as places of thinking, i. e. as places in which the productive appropriation of cultural heritage, which was qualified as appropriation qua philosophy in the previous section, can succeed. This is true for the museographic curation of philosophical heritage in particular, as well as for the curation of cultural heritage in general.

Places of thinking are the exact opposite of the precursors of today's museums, the cabinets of curiosities that emerged during the Renaissance. In the context of the Christian medieval defamation of *curiositas* as a vice and the rehabilitation of curios sensationalism in the Renaissance<sup>17</sup>, these cabinets probably satisfied sensationalism by exhibiting all kinds of rarities and thus

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17 This process of rehabilitating curios sensationalism began as early as the Middle Ages, due to certain freedoms of the intellectual and scientific pursuit of knowledge, for example in Thomas Aquinas' work. On this subject can be read in Daston, Park, 2002, pp.141-148.

certainly already obeyed an early form of attention economy. However, they were not designed to arouse curiosity, i. e., to promote the astonished openness that has been counted as the basic drive of philosophizing since Plato and Aristotle.

Since the beginnings of museum history, a lot has happened, of course. In particular, museum education has achieved a great deal in terms of the didactically successful communication of cultural heritage and the design of the experiential character of museum visits. Museums today are also places of learning and stimulation. However, it is questionable whether their potential as places of thinking is already being exhausted. Doubts about this are raised by a first empirical survey of the museographic offer dedicated to the cultural heritage of philosophical topics in Europe. In his research, Pumarola (2016: 56-60) comes up with a total of 24 centers of cultural heritage that explicitly deal with philosophical matters. For the most part, these are directly linked to the place of residence of major philosophical figures and are primarily devoted to the biography of these individuals. This narrowed focus on cultural and philosophical history is paradigmatically evident in the fact that, as Pumarola already remarked, Greece, the birthplace of Western philosophy, apparently attributes its own philosophical heritage primarily to the collections of archaeological museums.

Overall, Pumarola concludes that so far there seems to be only a very limited interest in creating museal places that do not thematize the philosophical heritage primarily in terms of historical philosophy and that initialize philosophical discourses in an institutionalized way. Evidently, there is still a largely unused room for the creation of new museums as well as for the reuse of existing museums. Though, the museographically staged exhibition of a bust of Socrates or a first edition of Kant's Cri-

tique of Pure Reason in the second edition does not yet turn this exhibition space into a place of thinking. Devotional objects of philosophy are no guarantee for philosophy in the museum. But neither are they a mandatory obstacle, even though the Latin *devotio* —translated to devotion and reverence— is not always the best prerequisite for embracing the motto of the Enlightenment, *sapere aude*, and for being able to use one's own understanding. From this perspective, the requirements for a philosophically oriented museum staging of philosophical heritage may be higher than for the presentation of other cultural goods. For in the latter, the philosophical content must be sought out; in the staging of the philosophical heritage, the philosophizing must first be wrested from the philosophically historically relevant objects.

Independently of the possible different challenges to museographic staging that can only be hinted at here, it becomes clear: philosophy in the museum can range from a philosophy museum to an offer to philosophizingly give a voice to cultural heritage based on museum education. Pumarola's research results suggest that, apart from «house museums» docked to the homes of well-known philosophical personalities, philosophy museums will be found rather rarely. Thus, a «museum of being» is just as unlikely to be found as a «museum of ethics». Such museums could be designed as «think-along museums», similar to the participatory and experimental museums that are often found in the environment of technology and science museums.

### *Museums as Places of Thinking*

Finally, in view of the local character of museal staging in both cultural and art museums, it is only briefly touch upon how philosophical appropriation processes can be promoted in mu-

seum environments, be it with reference to cultural goods of the philosophical or to cultural goods of other cultural heritage<sup>18</sup>. The conducive way of dealing with cultural heritage in the sense of Erich Fromm as a productive activity has been characterized and subsequently, philosophizing with Kant as precisely this incompletable process of appropriation within the framework of comprehension of the self, the other, and the world has been exposed. Museums as places of thinking (Ebers 2014) are then places that inspire this appropriation process by means of their stagings as well as their museum pedagogical efforts and that fuel this process as «Zündfunken» (Weschenfelder, Zacharias 1992: 155).

Opportunities for reflection provide themselves always and everywhere. Still, not only the spatial separation of museal staging but also the predominantly voluntary visit and stay, the de-functionalization of the exhibited artifacts, which are largely removed from their former functional contexts as far as they existed, and the presentation of cultural heritage that appeals to different senses can direct and expand these opportunities for reflection<sup>19</sup>.

Therefore, museums should neither be places of spectacle nor mere places of storage. They are places of remembrance,

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18 For the threefold division into nature, culture, and art museums based on conceptual history, see Walz 2016: 78. Science museums as well as technology museums are partly understood as separate categories. In the present context, they are assigned to the generic term cultural museums. To what extent nature museums are to be qualified or designed as places of thinking requires further consideration.

19 Deleuze and Guattari rightly point out that reducing philosophizing to reflection does not do justice to philosophy (Deleuze, Guattari 2014: 10). In contrast, they find the essential achievement of philosophy in the invention of concepts and in conceptual work. The process of mutual comprehension involved in this conceptual work, however, is precisely what is meant here by philosophy in the museum as philosophical appropriation of cultural heritage.



but following Nietzsche's tripartite, not in a monumental and not in an antiquarian, but in a critical perspective<sup>20</sup>. It is not about admiration or sentimentality and nostalgia. Cultural heritage makes it possible to refer back to the past in order, on the one hand, to play part in creating identity and, on the other hand, to open up paths for the future. Museums as places of thinking are heterotopias.

This term, coined by Michel Foucault, describes, paradoxically enough, located utopias, i. e. nowhere places, which are nevertheless to be visited. Heterotopias are

real places, effective places drawn into the institution of society, counter-placements or abutments, as it were, actually realized utopias in which the real places within culture are simultaneously represented, contested, and turned over, places outside all places, as it were, however they can actually be located. (Foucault 1990: 39, translation of the author)

In museums, in «these places outside of all places», people, each individually as well as together, can reflect on themselves and the world and enter into conversation about the world they want to live in. Such discourses, their stimulation and location, are becoming increasingly important, especially in light of increasing centrifugal forces in modern societies. Growing diversity of ethnic, cultural, and social origins as well as the multitude of different life concepts make the development of a discursive-democratic self-understanding emerge as a central challenge in our time.

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20 On this distinction, see Nietzsche, Friedrich: *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen. Zweites Stück: Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben* [Untimely Meditations. Second Essay: On the Use and Abuse of History for Life] (1874).

To support these discourses on the levels of museal conception, museal staging, and the accompaniment by museum education allows museums to become places of thinking and to (only) thereby become a part of the philosophical heritage themselves.

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